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How can LDCs benefit from the CDM?: A panel data analysis of 





The CDM plays an important role in the international GHG reduction activities. However, 
the distribution of CDM projects has been quite biased. Hence, considering the current 
distributional imbalance, this study was conducted aiming to identify the determinants of 
CDM project hosting in order to suggest potential measures for LDCs based on empirical 
evidence. By running random effects panel Tobit models, this paper sheds light on the fact 
that the four significant factors, GHG reduction potentials, governance levels, science and 
technology levels, and economic ties between host and Annex I countries in the private sector, 
have positive impacts on hosting CDM projects. This paper, therefore, denotes that the 
effective way to promote CDM activities in LDCs is to approach both sides: one is that 
LDCs accomplish the improvement of the significant factors by themselves; and the other is 
to facilitate the programmatic CDM activities by enlisting cooperation from international 
organisations or firms capable of investing in CDM activities in LDCs and/or providing 
capacity building programs. It is hoped that both Annex I and Non-Annex I countries tackle 
the climate change issue with stimulating the effective use of this innovative mechanism, 
CDM, not only in advanced developing countries but also in LDCs. 
Keywords: CDM, Kyoto Protocol, LDCs, ODA, Tobit model 
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1. Introduction 
The negotiations about climate change have been based on the scientific evidence in the 
IPCC Assessment Reports. The Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) was 
adopted in 1992 with the ultimate objective that aims to stabilise GHG concentrations below 
a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the global climate 
system (UNFCCC, 1992). After the issuance of IPCC AR2, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted 
in the third session of the conference of the parties (COP3) in Kyoto, Japan. The Kyoto 
Protocol has imposed legally binding targets only on industrialised countries (Annex I 
Parties)1 and introduced three market mechanisms, called the Kyoto Mechanism, namely 
CDM (Clean Development Mechanism), JI (Joint Implementation), and IET (International 
Emission Trading), in order to enable economic reductions of GHG emissions (UNFCCC, 
1998). The Marrakesh Accord, containing the ground rules of the Kyoto Protocol, was 
adopted in COP7, followed by the Bonn Agreement adopted in COP6 Part 2. Russia’s 
ratification of the protocol in 2005 finally made the Kyoto Protocol effective.  
Following the issuance of IPCC AR4 in 2007, the necessity of reducing 50% of global 
GHG emissions by 2050 to meet the 2°C threshold was highlighted at COP13 held in Bali, 
Indonesia (Boston, 2008). Likewise, in 2009, the Copenhagen Accord, adopted in COP15, 
declared it was necessary to largely cut global emissions in order to limit the increase of 
average global temperature within 2°C. As of 12 November 2010, 140 countries have 
associated themselves with the Copenhagen Accord and, of these, 85 have committed to 
reduce their GHG emissions or constrain their economic growth up to 2020 (UNEP, 2010b).  
This consensus has remained consistent throughout all international conferences after 
COP13. While the detailed rules of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol 
have not been determined yet, the international community, excluding Canada, Japan, and 
Russia, reached an agreement that secures the existence of the second commitment period in 
COP17 in 2011. 
The CDM has dual objectives: to reduce GHG emissions; and to contribute to sustainable 
development in host countries (UNFCCC, 1998). It enables Annex I Parties to fulfil their 
national targets set out under the Kyoto Protocol by carrying out GHG reducing activities in 
eligible host countries (Non-Annex I Parties)2 instead of their own countries. Host countries 
can earn tradable Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) issued by the CDM executive board. 
The amounts of CERs are determined based on the amounts of GHG emissions reduced by 
CDM projects. While it is likely that the CDM has been achieving the first objective, 
reducing GHG emissions in a cost effective manner (e.g., Huang and Barker, 2008; Paulsson, 
2009; Sutter and Parreño, 2007), several controversial issues have appeared such as an 
unequal distribution of CDM projects and ignorance of least developed countries (LDCs) 
(e.g., IGES, 2010; UNEP Riso Center, 2008) (Table 1).  
                                                 
1 Annex I Parties are mainly industrialised countries comprised of the members of the OECD, the European 
Union, and 14 countries with 'economies in transition' which are committed to greenhouse gas reduction targets. 
2 Eligible host countries are countries ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and establish a designated national authority. 
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In reality, there is an obvious and wide agreement that the distribution of the CDM 
projects has been quite uneven among the developing nations (e.g. Muller, 2007; Boyd et al., 
2009; Flamos, 2010). To date, 128 Non Annex countries are able to host CDM projects3 
(UNFCCC, 2012b). Of the 128 countries, 53 countries have no CDM projects at all and 51 
countries possess less than ten projects (UNFCCC, 2012c), whereas the numbers of 
registered CDM projects and projects submitted for registrations have been steadily 
increasing even now (Fig. 1).  
Currently, there are 4,322 CDM projects across developing countries (UNFCCC, 2012b). 
Yet the top two emerging economies, namely China and India, possess 2,121 and 855 CDM 
projects, respectively as of 7 July 2012 (UNFCCC, 2012b). In other words, only two 
countries account for approximately 70% of total CDM projects (Fig. 2). It is certain that 
they benefit from receiving the tremendous amount of fund flows from the sales of CERs 
(Fig. 3).   
In response to this imbalance in CDM project distribution, many developing nations 
lodged complaints against the imbalance of CDM benefits distribution on the basis of 
Decision 17/CP.7 of the Marrakesh Accords stipulating the necessity of the promotion of 
equitable distribution of CDM activities at regional and sub-regional levels (UNFCCC, 
2001). This situation seems to be becoming critical as there are two conditions for the Kyoto 
Protocol to take effect: one is to secure the ratifications of no less than 55 countries; and the 
other is to secure 55% of the total GHG emissions of all developed nations at the 1990 level, 
regardless of the number of ratified nations (UNFCCC, 1998). If the issue were mishandled 
it could potentially result in the secession of many developing countries; remaining countries 
would be likely to criticize the effectiveness of the protocol. Therefore, this needs to be 
resolved to ensure equality among developing countries and to maintain stable operations of 
the Kyoto Protocol itself.    
  As the most probable cause of the unequal distribution of CDM projects, lower GHG 
reduction capabilities are frequently mentioned in the corresponding literature (e.g., Haites, 
2004). Meanwhile, some empirical studies on the distribution of CDM projects have 
uncovered several decisive factors for a CDM project hosting. For instance, Flues (2010) 
reported that the number of CDM projects is explicitly influenced by factors categorised into 
three groups: CDM potentials, feasibilities, and profitability. However, findings identified by 
previous empirical studies are based on static analysis using cross-country data.  
The twofold objectives of this paper, therefore, are to: first, specify more precise and 
appropriate factors affecting CDM project hosting; and second, show a more appropriate 
route of benefits to less endowed countries from the CDM. Hence, contrary to existing 
literatures, this study carries out a dynamic data analysis utilising a panel data for the period 
between 2005 and 2010. 
                                                 
3 In order to host CDM projects, it is necessary for developing nations to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and set up a 
Designated National Authority (DNA) in their countries to supervise and review the CDM projects. 
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a conceptual 
framework to be utilised for establishing empirical models to indentify the determinants of 
CDM project hosting and some hypotheses generated based on findings from literature 
review. Section 3 presents analytical methodologies and data used. Estimated results and 
relevant discussions are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 summarises highlights and 
addresses environmental and development policy implications advantageous for LDCs. 
 
2. Literature review 
This section reviews the earlier literature on decisive factors of CDM project hosting. All in 
all, whilst many the theoretical studies have presumed and argued the determinants of CDM 
project hosting, the number of empirical studies based on quantitative analysis has been very 
limited. The major findings of existing theoretical and empirical studies are summarised in 
Sections 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. Based on the findings of the literature, the conceptual 
framework for a panel data analysis is illustrated in Section 2.3. 
 
2.1  Theoretical studies 
A growing theoretical literature has shown that the low potentials for GHG emission 
reductions hinder the implementation of CDM project activities in LDCs (e.g., Haites, 2004; 
Jung, 2006). For instance, Jung (2006) states that countries well-endowed with CDM 
projects had emitted a large amount of GHGs before the CDM came into effect in 2005 and, 
what is more, those countries seem eager to boost the number of CDM activities further on 
their own without investments from advanced nations. In contrast, there have been few 
industries emitting the vast amount of GHGs in the LDCs. The potential for launching CDM 
projects in LDCs is, therefore, likely to be fundamentally very low (Haites, 2004). This is 
because projects that produce small amounts of CERs may be judged as commercially 
unattractive by investors following the principle of the market mechanism (Kasai, 2012).  
With respect to disputes about socioeconomic factors, Jahn et al. (2004) and Michaelowa 
(2007) theoretically argue that certain levels of human capital, institutional and infrastructural 
capacities, and financial capital availability are required to host CDM project activities. 
Accordingly, if host countries have higher risk premiums for CDM investors, it ought to be 
more appropriate and feasible for those countries to implement CDM activities unilaterally 
(Jahn et al., 2004). Flues (2010) alleges that, while some eligible industrialised host countries 
are able to adopt relatively advanced GHG reduction technologies with comparative ease, 
LDCs must confront considerable technical barriers for the use of those technologies due to 
their insufficient technological levels. Moreover, governance levels can be regarded as one of 
determinants in theoretical literature as effective goverance is needed to facilitate CDM 
activities due to its complex procedures. For instance, Olawuyi (2009) implies that the gaps 
in economic, social and administrative conditions among developing countries directly and 
powerfully affect the attractiveness of CDM host countries. 
In summary, based on the theoretical literatures, GHG emission levels, economic 
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conditions, and social conditions are thought to play important roles in promoting CDM 
project activities. Those factors are likely to be found as decisive factors of CDM project 
hosting in this paper. 
 
2.2  Empirical studies 
Previous empirical research papers applied various analytical methods and their results have 
been mired in controversy on occasion. Compared to theoretical studies, the number of 
empirical studies on the distributional issue is limited and are chronologically explained in 
the following paragraphs and summarised in Table 2. This data helps to describe the 
appropriateness and effectiveness of a conceptual framework and the selection of 
methodologies that appear later in this paper. 
First of all, Dinar et al. (2008) carried out an empirical study that focused on identifying 
significant factors influencing the levels of cooperation between host and investor countries. 
They hypothesised that theories of international relations (i.e., FDI inflows and trade) play 
roles in the promotion of CDM activities and thus applied theories of international economic 
activities as mentioned above. As a result, their analyses using four models (Poisson, Logit, 
Probit, and Tobit models) identifies several significant factors for the levels of cooperation in 
CDM project activities: economic development; institutional development; the energy 
structure; levels of vulnerability to climate change impacts; and relationships between the 
host and investor countries. Finally, they emphasised the importance of simplifying 
regulations and registration processes regarding the CDM towards a CDM reform, 
improving the governance levels of host countries, and strengthening economic activities 
between host and investor countries.  
Similarly, Wang and Firestone (2010) analysed the determinants of the amount of CERs 
using a gravity model based on an international trade theory. Consequently, the study 
demonstrates that the domestic GHG emission levels of both host and investor countries are 
the primary determinant of CDM project hosting, which is consistent with their hypotheses. 
The regression result also indicates that the degree of openness to international trade, 
infrastructure, and project sizes are significant determinants. Based on their findings, Wang 
and Firestone (2010) speculated the importance of technical support and official 
development assistance (ODA) from advanced nations in the context of improving 
infrastructure in host countries.    
A study conducted by Flues (2010) also considered the uneven CDM distribution issue. 
They created a framework consisting of three dimensions: potential, feasibility, and 
profitability on the basis of a hypothesis that the probability of CDM projects is thought to be 
determined by the three dimensions. The estimation results affirm, based on the estimation 
results of Poisson QML model and negative binomial hurdle model, that the number of 
CDM projects is positively affected by economic development and growth, fossil fuel, 
renewable energy potential, and institutional qualities as significant determinants of CDM 
project distribution. Of special note is that the study reveals the fact there are clear 
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differences in the size of coefficients between the determinants of bilateral and unilateral 
CDM projects.4 Ultimately, Flues (2010) concluded that the CDM is not a promising 
mechanism for LDCs, noting the need of financial assistance from GEF (Global 
Environmental Facility)5 to LDCs.  
Subsequently, Winkelman and Moore (2011) investigated the determinants of CDM 
projects and CERs distributions using Probit and truncated regression models, respectively. 
The study differs from the past studies in terms of the selection of independent variables and 
the scope of a dependent variable. The Probit model covered 115 eligible host countries, 
excluding developing countries that have not established DNAs yet as it is technically 
impossible to host CDM projects without establishing a DNA. As a result, the study confirms 
that GHG emissions, electricity capacity growth rates, CDM capacity building, and 
educational levels have positive and significant effect on both the number of CDM project 
hosting and the amount of CERs. Meanwhile, institutional index and FDI inflows are 
statistically insignificant different from their expectations. Lastly, Winkelman and Moore 
(2011) pointed out that their findings proved the inevitability of poor opportunities of 
developing CDM projects in LDCs.  
In the most recent empirical research paper on the CDM imbalance issue, Kasai (2012) 
also attempted to identify the determinants of CDM project hosting using Tobit model. 
Following the study conducted by Flues (2010), the study adopted dependent variables of 
registered unilateral and bilateral, including multilateral, CDM projects. Independent 
variables used were categorised into four categories: GHG reduction potentials, human 
capital, business environment, and links to advanced nations. The study particularly focused 
on two factors, namely the qualities of business environment and scientific levels in host 
countries. Consequently, the study finds that three factors relevant to business environment 
and scientific levels in eligible host countries using proxies of sub-indices of Ease of Doing 
Business Index and the number of scientific and technical journal articles. Kasai (2012) 
mentioned that LDCs would be better off considering using programmatic CDM6 with 
emphasis on the need of capacity building programs by international organisations.  
 
2.3  Conceptual framework 
This section describes a conceptual framework which is structured based on the findings of 
existing papers and further hypothetical theories. This framework guides the selection of 
                                                 
4 Bilateral CDM projects are the standard form of CDM projects involving Annex I Party and a host country. 
Projects involved more than one Annex I Parties are called multilateral CDM projects, though, in this article, 
bilateral projects include multilateral projects for convenience. Unilateral CDM projects are projects embarked 
by a host country independently without the participation of Annex I Parties at the time of registration. 
5 The GEF is the world’s largest international fund which grants funds and technical support to help developing 
countries tackle global environmental issues. It also performs as a financing mechanism for the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, etc. 
6 The programmatic CDM is a mechanism which reduces GHG emissions by implementing programme based 
activities and it enables the creation of CERs by combining the tiny amount of GHG reduction activities. 
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dependent and independent variables used in analytical models of this study. As can be seen 
from Fig. 4, independent variables used in this study are categorised into four groups and 
chosen based mainly on the aforementioned findings of existing theoretical and empirical 
studies.  
To begin with, this study decided to utilise a dependent variable of the number of 
registered CDM project activities. When considering the amount of cash flows stemming 
from CER sales to host countries, the amount of (expected) CERs generated by CDM project 
activities should be used as a dependent variable. This study, however, chose the number of 
CDM projects because the objective of this paper is to make realistic suggestions that enable 
LDCs to embark upon CDM project activities even with small scale projects. Further, it is 
not really feasible to adopt CERs in this case since the amount of CERs is heavily distorted 
by the stage of industrial development of a host country, meaning that there are few chances 
for LDCs owing to lower industrial levels. In fact, as can be seen from Table 3, only 
advanced developing countries have possessed CDM projects thereby generating a larger 
amount of CERs by reducing GHGs with higher global warming potentials (GWPs) (see 
Appendix I) such as HFCs, PFCs, and SF6. The CERs generated from such productive 
projects have been widening the gap between advanced host countries and other potential 
host countries including LDCs, which was a controversial issue at early stage of the CDM 
(e.g., Hourcade and Toman, 1999).  
With regard to independent variables, this study adopts four categories of independent 
variables against the dependent variable, the number of registered CDM projects, based on 
the consideration of findings in past literature. As Fig. 4 shows, four categories are: GHG 
reduction potentials; socioeconomic factors; human capital; and links to advanced countries, 
each of which contains one to three independent variable(s) in order to explain the number of 
CDM projects. For the sake of carrying out more valuable analysis, independent variables are 
thoroughly selected taking into account the importance, proprieties, and data availabilities of 
those variables to build better panel data sets in long format. The independent variables 
adopted in each category and their expected effects are shown in Table 4.  
The reasons of the selection of independent variables and hypotheses derived from 
controversial and/or inadequate points in the earlier researches are illustrated in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
GHG reduction potentials 
As frequently argued in many theoretical literatures (e.g., Haites, 2004; Jung, 2006), GHG 
reduction potentials is likely to be one of the crucial factors for CDM project hosting. This 
argument has actually been proven by three empirical studies carried out by Kasai (2012),  
Wang and Firestone (2010), and Winkelman and Moore (2011). Furthermore, the importance 
of GHG reduction potentials can be regarded as reasonable because any CDM activities 
cannot be developed in host countries without the certain level of GHG emissions in the past. 
Hence, this study adopts an independent variable of CO2 emissions, which is a GHG making 
  pg. 8 
 
the most significant contribution to global warming, as a proxy for GHG reduction potentials 
in accordance with the findings of previous studies. 
 
Socioeconomic factors 
A mainstream perspective in the theoretical literature has argues that socioeconomic factors 
are important for hosting CDM projects. It has been maintained that conditions of economic, 
political, governance, and infrastructure have influence to attract CDM investors. This study 
adopts three independent variables regarding socioeconomic factors: GDP per capita; 
governance effectiveness; and the control of corruption. 
  Independent variables explaining economic conditions in host countries are confirmed as 
significant determinants of CDM project hosting in two empirical studies conducted by 
Dinar et al. (2008) and Flues (2010) which utilised the variables of GDP and GDP per capita, 
respectively. These findings are consistent with the theoretical literature and are reasonable 
considering the fact that GHG emission levels and GDP levels are highly correlated (e.g., a 
correlation coefficient between GHG emissions and GDP in 2009 = .961). This study judges 
that GDP per capita is a better variable than GDP because GDP per capita can decrease the 
population gap among eligible host countries and capture their real economic conditions 
more appropriately. GDP per capita, thus, is selected as a proxy of an economic status in this 
study. 
As one of many factors explaining socioeconomic conditions, a growing theoretical 
literature has explained that governance levels in host countries matter to attract CDM 
investors (e.g., Jahn et al., 2004; Michaelowa, 2007). This argument is supported by one 
empirical literature (Dinar et al., 2008) which analysed factors affecting the cooperation 
levels between developing and developed countries in terms of the CDM. Alternatively, the 
other empirical study carried out by Winkelman and Moore (2010) reports the insignificance 
of institutional index come from World Governance Indicators (WGI)7. The significance of 
governance levels, thereafter, needs to be further assessed to figure out its real influence on 
CDM activities. This study, thus, employs an independent variable of governance 
effectiveness sourced from WGI. The first hypothesis is formulated here as shown below: 
H1: When eligible host countries have better governance capacity, they possess more CDM 
projects. 
  Another factor that may or may not influence in promotion of CDM activities is corruption. 
As it is often assumed in the literature on developing economics (e.g., Gupta et al., 2002; 
Mauro, 1995), the corruption is likely to be a major factor responsible for income inequality 
and poverty in developing nations, lowering the probability of the implementation of CDM 
projects. The mechanism that causes inequality of CDM project distribution seems to be 
similar to that of income inequality. Therefore, this paper attempts to test the impacts of 
                                                 
7 WGI reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for 213 countries over the period between 1996 
and 2010. 
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corruption on CDM project hosting using one of indicators of WGI, control of corruption. 
 
Human capital  
Theoretically speaking, human capital must be one of significant factors promoting CDM 
project activities (e.g., Michaelowa, 2007). The diversity of views, in fact, can be found in 
the empirical literature. On the one hand, Winkelman and Moore (2011) show that 
educational index, which is one of components of the Human Development Index (HDI) 
created by UNDP, is positively and statistically significant. On the other hand, Wang and 
Firestone (2010) were not able to observe the significance of general educational level using 
an independent variable of tertiary education percentages obtained from the Global 
Competitive Report. These contradicting findings are to be assessed in this study. As is often 
argued in the literature, when considering hosting CDM project activities, it must be 
important for host countries to secure qualified personnel in general. This is because 
developing and managing CDM projects are complex tasks which require persons in charge 
of CDM activities to correctly grasp complicated regulations, procedures, methodologies, 
tools, and so forth. 
  Taking into account the implementation of CDM project activities in reality, what host 
countries particularly require is personnel familiar with scientific knowledge as CDM 
projects reduce GHGs normally using scientific and technical methodologies. Such abilities 
may not be necessarily important if project participants (PPs) from Annex I countries were 
fully in charge of writing project design documents (PDDs), validations and verifications 
carried out by designated operational entities (DOEs)8, and actual implementation of CDM 
projects. Having said that, PPs in host countries must need to manage CDM projects after 
starting operations of CDM projects, including not only stable operations but also monitoring 
the amount of GHGs reduced by CDM projects. Thus, science and technology levels of host 
countries still seem to matter. Based on the above discussions, this study formulates the 
second hypothesis (H2) as follows: 
H2: Scientific and technical levels foster the implementation of CDM project activities. 
To summarize, this study uses two independent variables related to human capital: tertiary 
school enrolment rate; and the number of scientific and technical journal articles. This 
follows the study carried out by Kasai (2012) which reveals the significance of those two 
factors. 
 
Links to advanced countries 
In addition to host countries’ endogenous factors, given that CDM is a mechanism basically 
to be implemented by PPs in both host and investor countries, holding strong links to 
advanced countries should increase the probability of investment in CDM projects (Flues, 
                                                 
8 DOEs are independent auditors accredited by the CDM Executive Board to validate proposed CDM projects 
and verify whether or not implemented CDM projects have achieved expected GHG reductions.  
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2010).    
An empirical literature (Dinar et al., 2008) demonstrates the importance of tighter links to 
advanced nations using an independent variable of total trade (the sum of the volume of 
bilateral imports and exports) between the host and investor countries. On the contrary, 
whilst Flues (2010) attempted to confirm the significance of links to advanced nations using 
a dummy variable of colonial status, which indicates 1 if countries were the former British, 
Spanish, Dutch, German, and French colonial counties; 0 otherwise, the result fails to 
demonstrate it. Also, another empirical literature (Wang and Firestone, 2010) shows 
insignificant results on common colony dummies. Considering this result, this study adopts a 
revised colonial dummy, which is 1 if countries were in the British colony in the past; 0 
otherwise. This revision is based on the fact that the U.K. is the largest CDM investor in the 
world. As can be seen from Fig. 5, Spain, the Netherlands, Germany, and France have had 
limited influence in CDM markets. This study thereby hypothesizes that: 
H3: Former British colonies have retained a strong connection to the U.K. (a leading CDM 
investor) and, due to the connection, have received a certain amount of investment in CDM.  
In addition to the revised colonial dummy, this study utilises two more independent 
variables as proxies of links to advanced countries, namely foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows and ODA received. This is because both factors can be thought to be good indicators 
for relationship between host and developed countries as explained in the following 
paragraphs.  
Looking at FDI inflows, there is a contradiction amongst the existing literature. On the one 
hand, a theoretical literature (Jung, 2006) states that host countries having abundant FDI 
inflows tend to host larger number of CDM activities. Moreover, Dinar et al. (2008) insist 
that the CDM can be regarded as a sort of FDI. On the other hand, when looking at the result 
of an empirical study (Winkleman and Moore, 2011), it shows insignificance of FDI inflows 
though it adopted as a proxy of business environment. Further, Niederberger and Saner 
(2005) keenly refute the effects of FDI inflows on CDM investment based on the fact that 
some countries having failed to induce FDI have actually succeeded in hosting CDM 
projects. This study attempts to verify whether or not FDI inflows has significant impacts in 
promoting CDM activities since, as discussed above, the results regarding FDI are not 
identical in previous literature. The fourth hypothesis, thus, is formulated here as follows: 
H4: The larger the FDI inflows eligible host countries receive, the more CDM projects they 
are able to host. 
Another factor to consider is ODA, no study analysed its significance except for Kasai 
(2012) whose result indicates statistically insignificance of the log of ODA received. This 
result seems inconclusive as the variable of ODA is employed only in one specification out 
of six. This paper expects that the amount of receiving ODA reflects the political and/or 
economic closeness between developing and developed countries. This study attempts to 
testify the significance of it. Hence, this study proposes the fifth hypothesis as shown below: 
H5: Countries receiving a larger ODA tend to host a larger number of CDM projects. 
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3  Methodology and data 
3.1  Methodology 
This study attempts to identify decisive factors of CDM project hosting by using, not only 
cross-section analysis, but also a panel data analysis which never before undertaken. There 
are two major obstacles to the estimate panel data: first, is its complexity of data analysis; 
and, second,  the limited data availabilities. A panel data analysis requires a lot of data 
collected from both time series and cross-section dimensions. In contrast, according to 
Kitamura (2006), this feature can bring four major advantages: firstly, precisions of 
regression results improves due to its increased observations; secondly, differences in 
individual countries, for this study, can be captured as fixed effects; thirdly, behaviours of 
countries can be depicted as they are affected by economic situations or policies; and fourthly, 
the influence of outliers or errors can be weakened. Hence, although some restrictions occur 
in selecting variables, this paper utilises panel data analysis in addition to multi-year 
cross-section data analysis. 
  More specifically, this paper adopts Tobit models as primary estimators, which was 
developed by Tobin (1958). Data of independent variables are available for all eligible host 
countries including countries not hosting CDM projects. The data set, thereafter, can be 
regarded as censored data in which any negative values of dependent variables are set to a 
lower bound of zero. Hence, Type I Tobit model (censored regression model), defined by 
Amemiya (1984) described below is used for cross-section analysis.  
ݕ௜∗ ൌ x௜	β ൅ ݑ௜, 		ݑ௜~݅݅݀Normalሺ0, σଶሻ 
ݕ௜ ൌ ൜		y௜
∗							ݕ௜∗ ൒ 0
0									ݕ௜∗ ൏ 0 
where y௜∗ is a latent response variable of individual i, x௜	 is an independent variables of 
individual i, and ݑ௜ is a residual of individual i. The latent variable y௜∗ satisfies the classical 
linear model assumptions that have a normal and homoscedastic distribution with a linear 
conditional mean. An observed variable ݕ௜ is equal to ݕ௜∗ when ݕ௜∗ ൒ 0, but y equals 0 
when ݕ௜∗ ൏ 0. Since ݕ௜∗ is normally distributed, ݕ௜  has a continuous distribution over 
strictly positive values. 
  With regard to panel data analysis, as mentioned above, panel Tobit (random effects) 
estimators are employed. Moreover, panel OLS models (fixed and random effects) are 
utilised for robustness checks using an uncensored data which is created by excluding 
observations with no CDM projects. The panel Tobit estimator is described as follows: 
ݕ௜௧∗ ൌ ݔ௜௧ᇱ β ൅ ݑ௜௧, 		ݑ௜௧ ൌ ߤ௜ ൅	ݒ௜௧	, 	ݒ௜௧~݅݅݀Normalሺ0, ߪ௩ଶሻ 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ൜		y௜௧
∗ 							ݕ௜௧∗ ൒ 0
0									ݕ௜௧∗ ൏ 0 
where ݕ௜௧∗  represents a latent variable of individual i at time t. ݔ௜௧ᇱ  is a vector of 
independent variable of individual i at time t. ݑ௜௧ is an error term of individual i at time t, 
which captures the unobserved factors influencing dependent variables. ߤ௜ represents the 
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unobserved time invariant individual effects which measures unobserved individual 
heterogeneity. Lastly, ݒ௜௧	 is an unobserved time variant errors which is assumed to be 
normal distribution as described in the equation above. However, if ݒ௜௧	 is influenced by 
unobserved independent heterogeneity, the assumption which ݒ௜௧	 is iid normal distribution 
cannot be maintained, meaning that the unobserved characteristics of individual countries 
have significant impacts on the number of CDM project hosting. For instance, the level of 
motivation towards CDM activities might be unobserved characteristics significantly 
affecting the number of CDM projects. Theoretically speaking, it is reasonable to simulate 
that such factor and unobserved heterogeneity exit. This problem can be resolved by making 
use of the proxy of an unobserved factor, although the variable of such factor is not available 
in reality. This is the reason why the panel Tobit model contains additional equation,	ݑ௜௧ ൌ
ߤ௜ ൅	ݒ௜௧	. In other words, ߤ௜ is the proxy of an unobserved characteristic of host countries.  
  The unobserved effects, ߤ௜, is assumed to be either fixed or random effects. Fixed effects 
imply that ߤ௜ is correlated with the observed variables. On the contrary, a random effect 
means that ߤ௜ is not correlated with any of the observed variabels in the model. When 
considering applying this model to this study, since the Tobit model is a non-linear model, it 
is technically impossible to utilise the fixed effects estimator (Wooldridge, 2002). 
In order to observe the variation of the regression results and to capture the effect of each 
factor separately, this study forms six specifications. The main model (Spec 6) contains eight 
independent variables following the conceptual framework as shown below: 
݈݊ܿ݀݉௜௧ ൌ 	ߙ௜ ൅ ߚଵ݈݊ܿ݋2௜௧ିଶ ൅ ߚଶ݃݋ݒ݁ ௜݂௧ିଶ ൅ ߚଷܿ݋ݎݎݑ݌௜௧ିଶ ൅ ߚସ݈݊ݐ݁ݎݐ݅ܽݎݕ௜௧ିଶ
൅ ߚହ݈݊ܽݎݐ݈݅ܿ݁௜௧ିଶ ൅ ߚ଺݈݂݊݀݅௜௧ିଶ ൅ ߚ଻݈݊݋݀ܽ௜௧ିଶ ൅ ߚ଼ܿ݋݈݋݊ݕ௜ ൅ ݑ௜௧ 
where  
lncdmit: the log of the number of registered CDM projects of country i at time t; 
lnco2it-2: the log of CO2 emissions of country i at time t with a two-year lag; 
govefit-2: governance effectiveness of country i at time t with a two-year lag; 
corrupit-2: control of corruption of country i at time t with a two-year lag; 
lntertiaryit-2: the log of tertiary school enrolment rate of country i at time t with a two-year 
lag; 
lnarticleit-2: the log of the numbers of scientific and technical journal articles of country i 
at time t with a two-year lag; 
lnfdiit-2: the log of FDI inflows of country i at time t with a two-year lag; 
lnodait-2: the log of ODA received of country i at time t with a two-year lag; 
colony: the former British colony dummy. 
 
As shown above, all independent variable have a two-year lag. This is because it normally 
takes essentially two years for proposed CDM projects to be registered as CDM projects by 
the CDM executive board (Fig. 6). Therefore, to capture the characteristics of host countries 
at the time when they launch CDM activities, two-year lags are applied to this study. 
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3.2  Empirical strategy 
  This study utilises cross-sectional Tobit models, pooled and random effects panel Tobit 
models applying robust standard errors owing to heterogeneity of error terms.  
  Additionally, this study runs pooled and panel OLS (both fixed and random effects) 
models applying robust standard errors to check the robustness of the results of the panel 
Tobit models. For that purpose, a new data set is created by excluding all samples with no 
CDM projects. Whilst there must be a selection bias in the OLS estimators, the result of 
those estimators ought to show similar signs and coefficients to those obtained from the 
panel models with random effects.  
  In summary, a procedure of the methodology which expresses a strategy of this paper is 
illustrated in Fig. 7 as follows: 
 
3.3  Data descriptions   
This section explains definitions, units, data sources and their validities to be used in the 
econometric models of all data used in this study. Both dependent and independent variables 
are thoroughly selected based on the conceptual framework and derived from various data 
sources. Some data are processed and transformed in logarithmic form for the purpose of 
empirical analysis. Definitions, units and data sources of both dependent and independent 
variables are listed in Table 5. 
Dependent variables used in this study are the log of the numbers of CDM projects 
registered in 2005 to 2010 which are sourced from the CDM project database created by the 
Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES, 2012). The selection of a dependent 
variable is in accordance with that of Flues (2010) and Kasai (2012) which is likely to be 
more feasible than others, such as all Non-Annex I countries, since it is technically 
impossible for developing countries to host CDM project activities without the DNAs. To 
identify more appropriate estimation results, those countries that have not established the 
DNAs should not be included in the analysis. The econometric models cover 128 eligible 
host countries which have ratified the Kyoto Protocol and established the Designated 
National Authority (DNA)9. 
Independent variables are obtained from various data sources as shown in Table 5. As 
discussed in the previous section, two-year lags are set for all independent variables except 
for colony dummy. As a result, those two-year lagged independent variables consist of data 
between 2003 and 2008. There are some missing values in the independent variables because 
of the data availabilities. In the case that a missing value can be reasonably estimated by 
taking the average between adjacent years’ data, the average value is inputted in the data set 
as an instant solution. Essentially , it can be predicted that those deficits are unlikely to have 
crucial impacts on the regression results since the number of them are limited and, moreover, 
                                                 
9 DNA is a body granted responsibility by a developing country to authorize and approve participation in CDM 
projects. The main task of the DNA is to assess potential CDM projects to determine whether they will assist the 
host country in achieving its sustainable development goals and to provide a letter of approval to PPs. 
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most missing values stems from eligible host counties which do not host any, or just a few, 
CDM projects.  
In line with the conceptual framework of this study, independent variables are carefully 
and comprehensively selected. All of them are categorised into four categories as shown 
below: 
lncdmi = f ( Gi, Si, Hi, Li ) 
where the dependent variable, lncdmi is the log of the number of registered CDM projects of 
host country i. Si, Hi, and Li stand for the sets of characteristics of the host country i relevant 
to GHG reduction potentials, socioeconomic factors, human capital and links to advanced 
countries, respectively.  
 
Descriptive statistics of both dependent and independent variables and correlation 
coefficients among independent variables with cross-section data sets are shown in Tables 6 
to 11 (2005 to 2010). Those of a panel data set are shown in Table 12 (2005-2010). Those of 
an uncensored panel data set, excluding all observation of countries that host no CDM 
projects, are shown in Table 13 (2005-2010). Furthermore, scatter diagrams indicating the 
relationships between dependent variables and independent variables of the panel data set are 
shown in Fig. 8. The following paragraphs provide the explanations of those sets of 
independent variables by category.    
 
GHG reduction potentials 
This study adopts the log of CO2 emissions as a proxy of GHG reduction potentials, although  
it is desirable to use GHG emission data consisting of six GHGs as other studies have (e.g., 
Wang and Firestone, 2010; Winkelman and Moore, 2010). The reason for this is because this 
study treats a panel data set differing from other literatures. Historical emission data of CH4, 
N2O, HFCs and PFCs have not been regularly collected. Only CO2 emission data is available 
from 2003 to 2008 consecutively. This paper considers that GHG reduction potentials can be 
measured using CO2 emissions as it accounts for around 80% of total GHG effects utilising 
data originating from World Development Indicators. 
  Looking at CO2 emission data, there is a clear upward trend across the all eligible host 
countries. The average increase rate is approximately 27% during the five-year period. 
Furthermore, there is an obvious trend that major CDM host countries have larger amounts 
of CO2 emissions in the five-year period. 
   
Socioeconomic factors 
This study adopts three independent variables in this category: the log of GDP per capita, 
government effectiveness and control of corruption.  
Firstly, this study utilises the log of GDP per capita as a proxy of economic level of host 
countries. Apparently, richer countries can develop CDM project activities much easier than 
poorer countries. As Fig. 8 shows, this clear conjecture, however, can be viewed a little 
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differently if per capita base GDP is used because the larger economies in terms of GDP 
levels very often have larger populations. This trend can be observed in the data of GDP per 
capita (2003-2008) which are sourced from World Development Indicators. Aside from that, 
the eligible host countries’ entire increase rate of GDP per capita during the five-year period 
is approximately 45%. 
Secondly, following a finding of Dinar et al. (2008), government effectiveness and control 
of corruption are adopted in this study as proxies of important social factors in eligible host 
countries. The data of government effectiveness and control of corruption cover the period 
from 2003 to 2008 and originate from Worldwide Governance Indicators. In general, good 
governance is likely to help in promoting CDM activities. Roughly speaking, there is a wide 
gap in the average percentile ranks between LDCs and other eligible host countries. For 
instance, the average percentile rank within LDCs in 2010 is about 24, and on the one hand, 
that within non-LDCs is around 48, on the other. Likewise, control of corruption measured in 
a percentile rank has an obvious gap. While the average percentile rank among LDCs is 
approximately 29, non-LDC countries’ average percentile rank is around 49. From this 
difference, it is possible to regard corruption as one of deterrents for the development of 
CDM project activities.    
 
Human capital 
In this category, there are two independent variables: the log of tertiary school enrolment rate 
and the log of the number of scientific and technical journal articles. The data of both 
variables from 2003 to 2008 are derived from World Development Indicators.  
The log of tertiary school enrolment rate is adopted to investigate whether the entire 
educational levels have significant effects on CDM activities in accordance with two 
empirical literatures written by Kasai (2012) and Winkelman and Moore (2011). In addition 
to that, this study focuses on science and technology levels of host countries. The number of 
scientific and technical journal articles being published from host countries is a good 
predictor for the levels. The second variable, the proxy of science levels of eligible host 
countries, is important as to have qualified personnel familiar with scientific and technical 
knowledge can facilitate the development of CDM projects. Seemingly, the data set indicates 
a strong tendency for countries who have published many science and technology articles to 
host more CDM projects. 
 
Links to advanced countries 
Three independent variables are designated in this category. Links to advanced countries 
must be one of the key factors in order to improve economic situations because advanced 
nations have sufficient abilities to invest in developing countries in terms of both funds and 
human capital.  
Firstly, the log of FDI inflows is adopted to measure the effects of economic cooperation 
levels in private sectors between developed and developing countries. As described in the 
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conceptual framework, two studies used this independent variable and they present opposite 
results. This study anticipates that the estimation result for FDI inflows shows positive sign 
and significant influence in promoting CDM activities. Secondly, this study utilises the log of 
ODA received as a proxy of cooperation levels in the governmental sector. Certainly, both 
variables mentioned above can be regarded as variables associated with economic conditions, 
as the GDP per capita levels are affected by the two variables; this study uses them to 
measure the levels of links to advanced nations. Based on the trends shown in scatter 
diagrams in Fig. 8, it is evident that FDI inflows are highly correlated with the number of 
CDM projects (e.g., ρ=.953 in 2008). In contrast, there is no strong relationship between the 
CDM activities and ODA. 
Thirdly, this study uses a dummy variable which indicates 1 if countries were the British 
colonies in the past; 0 otherwise. As discussed in the conceptual framework, the U.K. is the 
leading CDM investor and thus this paper expects that the U.K. invest in the former British 
colonies due to strong connections amongst them. Of 128 eligible host countries, 43 are the 
former British colonies.  
 
4  Results and discussions  
In this section, estimation results are reported and discussed. Firstly, Section 4.1 presents the 
results of cross-section data analyses. Secondly, the main results derived from the random 
effects panel Tobit models are examined and five hypotheses formulated in the conceptual 
framework are verified in Section 4.2. Finally, the results of robustness checks for the main 
model (the panel Tobit with Spec 6) are confirmed in Section 4.3. 
 
4.1  Cross-country data analyses 
This study analysed cross-country data using Tobit models as a first step. The regression 
results for the years from 2005 to 2010 are shown in Tables 14 to 16.  
  Looking at log pseudo likelihood values, the main specification (Spec 6) fits the data sets 
of every year much better than other specifications, ranging from -44.8 in 2006 to -14.7 in 
2010. Spec 6 has the highest pseudo R-squared value among six specifications throughout 
the period, representing the best fit for the Tobit models as well, ranging from .286 in 2006 
to .741 in 2010. 
  The majority of the estimation results indicate the same signs and significance levels 
throughout the period. Specifically, the log of CO2 emissions is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level in most specifications. The similar results can be found for 
government effectiveness, the log of FDI inflows, and the log of ODA for several reasons. 
Firstly, government effectiveness has statistically significant positive effects on hosting CDM 
projects except for the result of the year 2006. The models indicating insignificance for this 
variable also show the same positive signs. Secondly, the log of FDI inflows is significant, 
below the 1% level in most specifications, with positive signs. Finally, the log of ODA is 
significant and positive in four models in 2006, 2008, and 2010. In contrast, the former 
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British colony dummies clearly denote significant negative impacts on CDM project hosting. 
Of 36 models, 11 are statistically significant and negative, contrary to the expectation of this 
study. As for control of corruption, it indicates significant positive effects at the maximum 
limit, the 10% significance level, in Spec 3 in 2007. This is the only model showing 
significance and all other models result in insignificant.  
As can be seen from Tables 14 to 16, the remaining independent variables, namely the log 
of GDP per capita, the log of tertiary school enrolment rates, and the log of scientific and 
technical journal articles, have both statistically significant positive and negative effects on 
hosting CDM activities. Their effects, therefore, are less clear and, as a result, their real 
effects cannot explicitly be judged by looking merely at the estimation results of 
cross-section data analyses. One possible reason for this is the smaller size of observations 
(e.g., the numbers of observations in Spec 6 range from 69 to 72) which make regression 
results less reliability. In addition, the multicollinearity is causally-related to the unstable 
estimation results. These problems are discussed in the next section which explains the 
results of panel Tobit models, the main analysis in this study. 
  Sensible time series variances cannot be observed from the estimation results with the 
exception of a trend that coefficients of the log of CO2 emissions have been soaring year by 
year from .663 in 2006 to 1.964 in 2010. This is likely to imply that more and more CDM 
investors tend to focus on GHG reduction potentials rather than other factors in the light of 
projects’ profitability.  
 
4.2  Panel data analyses 
This section discusses the regression results of pooled and panel Tobit models with random 
effects. The estimation results are shown in Table 17. As stated in the methodology section, 
the panel data analysis enables the identification of more reliable decisive factors owing to its 
larger size of observations. In fact, the number of observations for the main panel Tobit 
model (Spec 6) is 433, which is six times larger than that of cross-country data. Hence, it can 
be expected to obtain more accurate estimation results.   
When looking at the results of Wald tests, those in all specifications are significant, Prob > 
chi2 is 0.000, rejecting the null hypothesis and this means the models have explanation 
power at the 1% significance level. Thus, the results support the potencies of coefficients 
computed by the random effects Tobit estimators. Analogous to the cross-sectional Tobit 
models, the panel Tobit model with Spec 6 is the most appropriate model in terms of a fit to 
the model since the value of the log pseudo likelihood of Spec 6, which is -181.1, is the 
largest among six specifications. 
The estimation results are examined by category in the following paragraphs. 
 
4.2.1  GHG reduction potentials 
Regarding GHG reduction potentials, this study achieves a similar finding to existing 
empirical literatures (e.g., Wang and Firestone, 2010; Winkelman and Moore, 2011; Kasai, 
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2012).  
As can be seen from Table 17, the log of CO2 emissions is statistically significant and 
positive at the 1% significance level for all specifications as expected and the pooled Tobit 
models have the same results as well. This is obviously likely to illustrate the difficulty of 
hosting CDM project activities for LDCs, because the potentials of launching CDM projects 
in LDCs is low as there ordinarily exists few facilities emitting a volume of GHGs in those 
countries (e.g., Haites, 2004). Unsurprisingly, CDM investors would prefer to invest in 
eligible host countries with larger GHG reduction potentials following the principle of the 
market mechanism. Additionally, it must be important for host countries to have modest 
GHG abatement costs to attract CDM investors (e.g., Flues, 2010). By further extension, the 
results seem to imply that levels of economic development influence the number of CDM 
projects as economically well developed countries should have succeeded at industrialisation, 
which is the most common cause of being major GHG emitters. More importantly, the 
results seem to reveal that industrially well developed countries receive a larger amount of 
CDM benefits (CER sales). This is due to higher potentials to implement CDM projects 
generating a number of CERs by reducing the emissions of GHGs having higher GWPs such 
as HFCs, N2O, and SF6. 
To sum up, this study regards GHG reduction potentials as one of the important 
determinants of CDM project hosting. This finding is fully consistent with the expectations 
of this study and those of previous studies. GHG reduction potentials are solely determined 
by past GHG emission performances and cannot be controlled afterwards. It sounds 
imbalanced that those countries that have emitted a vast amount of GHGs can easily enjoy 
benefits from CDM despite the fact that they have stronger responsibilities for global 
warming.  
 
4.2.2  Socioeconomic factors 
Three independent variables, namely the log of GDP per capita, government effectiveness, 
and control of corruption, are the socioeconomic factors that are expected to have positive 
effects on CDM project hosting. However, their individual results are not identical and some 
are inconsistent with findings of previous studies.  
As for the log of GDP per capita used as a proxy of economic condition of host countries, 
this study finds significant negative effects on CDM project hosting at the 5% significance 
level in Spec 6 of panel Tobit models. Specs 1, 4, and 5 are insignificant holding different 
signs. When looking at the results of pooled Tobit model with Spec 5, it turns out statistically 
significant and positive at the 5% significance level, whereas it has significant negative 
effects in Spec 6 as well as that of the panel Tobit model. This study considers the result of 
the main panel Tobit model with Spec 6 as the most appropriate, meaning that the level of 
GDP per capita has statistically-significant negative impacts on hosting CDM projects. 
However, from a theoretical point of view, this result cannot easily be acceptable since better 
economic conditions must be an advantage for the development of CDM activities. In fact, 
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some empirical studies confirm its positive effects (Dinar et al., 2008; Flues, 2010). This may 
be attributable to the impacts of major CDM host countries which have relatively lower GDP 
per capita derived from their huge population sizes. This study, therefore, concludes that 
GDP per capita levels cannot directly be thought of as a determinant of CDM project hosting 
but it must have positive impacts indirectly.  
Governance levels measured by an indicator of government effectiveness are significant 
and positive in all specifications at the 1% significance level. This result is in accordance 
with a finding of the study carried out by Dinar et al. (2008). In contrast, this study cannot 
observe the significance of control of corruption which is a proxy of the degree of corruption 
in eligible host countries. Certainly, multicolleniarity occurred in the panel Tobit model with 
Spec 6 owing to a strong correlation between government effectiveness and control of 
corruption, .839. Yet, since the variable also is insignificant in Spec 3, this study judges that 
control of corruption is not statistically significant, whilst this finding is inconsistent with the 
finding of literatures associated with development economics (e.g., Gupta et al., 2002; 
Mauro, 1995). 
Based on the regression results, acquiring effective governance levels is likely to help 
promote CDM project activities. This study, however, implies that clean governance is not 
absolute necessity in so far as the governments are effective enough. Consequently, the first 
hypothesis below is proven here.  




4.2.3  Human capital 
In line with the study carried out by Kasai (2012), this study employed two independent 
variable concerning human capital: the log of tertiary school enrolment rates adopted as a 
proxy of general educational levels, and the log of the number of scientific and technical 
journal articles which is a proxy of science and technology levels of host countries.  
As Table 17 shows, contrary to this study’s expectation, the log of tertiary school 
enrolment rates is found to be insignificant in all specifications under both pooled and panel 
Tobit models, though signs are positive in most specifications. This result differs from the 
findings of the existing literatures (Kasai, 2012; Winkelman and Moore, 2011). However, the 
results of panel Tobit models are thought to be more reliable than the previous findings. This 
is because the results of this study are generated from a dynamic analysis using a larger size 
of observations.   
On the other hand, this study demonstrates the significance of science and technology 
levels at the 1% significance level in Spec 5 under the panel Tobit model. Nevertheless, the 
variable is insignificant in Spec 6. Due to a strong correlation between the log of the number 
of scientific and technical journal articles and the log of CO2 emissions, .837, the result of 
Spec 6 should be distorted by the impact of multicolleniarity. Thus the effects between those 
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two variables cannot be clearly captured individually.  
Consequently, this study concludes that science and technology levels positively affect the 
number of CDM project hosting based on the result of the panel Tobit model with Spec 5. 
This conclusion is backed by the results of cross-country analyses, the majority of which are 
statistically significant and positive. Moreover, this finding is rational as it is imperative for 
CDM developers to grasp technical aspects of GHG reduction technologies applied for CDM 
project activities.  
Summing up, as Kasai (2012) suggested, human capital is likely to be one of crucial 
factors in developing CDM projects. Eligible host countries eager to promote CDM activities 
should improve scientific and technical levels to retain qualified personnel. Accordingly, the 
second hypothesis is demonstrated here below. 
H2: Scientific and technical levels foster the implementation of CDM project activities.  
 Correct 
 
4.2.4  Links to advanced countries 
To host CDM project, links to advanced countries must be one of material factors as CDM 
projects are usually developed by PP(s) in host countries in cooperation with PP(s) in Annex 
I countries. This category comprises of three independent variables: the log of FDI inflows; 
the log of ODA; and the former British colony dummy. 
Firstly, this study finds that the former British colony dummy has statistically significant 
negative impacts on CDM project hosting differing from the expectation. The majority of 
estimation results of cross-country analyses and pooled Tobit show the same impacts. This is 
consistent with the study carried out by Wang and Firestone (2010). The adverse effects of 
the former British colonies seem to allude to the fact that CDM investors in the U.K. do not 
lay weight on colonial ties but focus mainly on profitability of projects (larger GHG 
reduction potentials). This tendency must be attributed to the nature of CDM, which in turn 
can be thought of as one of flaws that needs to be addressed. Given the above discussions, 
while this study cannot verify whether or not the former British colonies have strong ties 
with the U.K., it reveals that the former British colonies host less CDM projects. Therefore, 
the third hypothesis below is refuted by the analytical results.   
H3: Former British colonies have retained a strong connection to the U.K. (a leading CDM 
investor) and , due to the connection, have received a certain amount of investment in CDM.  
 Incorrect 
Secondly, the regression results of panel Tobit models show that the log of FDI inflows is 
statistically significant and positive at the 1% level in Spec 4 and the 5% level in Spec 6. 
Similarly, the cross-sectional and pooled Tobit models have the same results. This result is in 
accordance with the argument of the previous theoretical literatures (e.g., Dinar et al., 2008; 
Jung, 2006; Niederberger and Saner, 2005), but contradicts the empirical result of 
Winkleman and Moore (2011). Taking into account the characteristic of CDM projects, 
activities basically implemented by private firms, it appears certain that economic ties 
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between eligible host countries and developed countries in the private sector facilitate CDM 
activities. This study, therefore, regards FDI inflows as a significant determinant of CDM 
project hosting based on both theoretical and empirical points of views of this study. Hence, 
the forth hypothesis below is proven. 
H4: The larger the FDI inflows eligible host countries receive, the more CDM projects they 
are able to host.  
 Correct 
Lastly, the log of ODA is not significant in all specifications under panel Tobit models. 
This result is consistent with that of the study carried out by Kasai (2012). Although this 
paper generated the fifth hypothesis by expecting that the amount of receiving ODA reflects 
the political and/or economic closeness between developing and developed countries, the 
results explicitly refuted the hypothesis. The statistical insignificance of the log of ODA is 
likely to suggest that CDM investors act differently from their governments by following the 
market mechanism or other factors. 
H5: Countries receiving a larger ODA tend to host a larger number of CDM projects. 
 Incorrect 
 
4.3  Robustness checks 
This study estimated pooled and panel OLS models with fixed effects and random effects to 
check the robustness of the main models, the panel Tobit models. As well as panel Tobit 
models, Spec 6 is the most proper model with the highest R-squared, .595. As discussed in 
the section of methodology, since this analysis adopted uncensored data which excludes all 
observations not having CDM projects, the panel OLS estimators can be expected to show 
similar results to the panel Tobit models. 
  Table 18 reports the estimation results of OLS models. Before discussing the regression 
results, the most preferred models have to be identified among the pooled OLS, the fixed 
effects panel OLS model, and the random effects panel OLS. The results of F-tests chose 
fixed effects models over simple pooling models by rejecting a null hypothesis assuming that 
individual fixed effects are absent. Next, Hausman tests reject the fixed effects models in 
favour of the random effects models. Accordingly, the regression results of the panel OLS 
with random effects are utilised to check the signs and significances of the main models. 
  Looking at the estimation results, it appears that an entire picture is similar between the 
panel Tobit models and random effects OLS models. For instance, three major determinants 
found in the main models, the log of CO2 emissions, the log of the number of scientific and 
technical journal articles, and the log of FDI inflows, are statistically significant and positive 
at the 1% significance level. However, a few exceptions occur. Some variables become 
insignificant in Spec 6 different from those of main models. These subtle inconsistencies 
might be caused by the different methods used in both models. Certainly, Tobit models based 
on maximum likelihood estimation method are innately different from the OLS method.  
However, as mentioned above, the general results are similar. Furthermore, while some 
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variables are insignificant differing from those of the main models, their signs are the same in 
most variables. Therefore, this study concludes that the robustness checks support to the 
main results. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
5.1  Research summary  
UNEP (2011) argues that reducing GHG emissions to the level that can hold a temperature 
rise within 2°C is technologically and economically feasible. Theoretically speaking, this 
might be true, but in reality, it is highly unlikely to happen. To realise this goal, it is necessary 
to undertake immediate and pertinent actions with the international community (UNEP, 
2010b). In this context, the CDM, the world’s first innovative financial mechanism which 
enables the reduction of GHG emissions internationally in a cost-effective manner, was 
entered into force in 2005. In fact, the CDM plays an important role in the international GHG 
reduction activities (e.g., Sutter and Parreño, 2007).  
Meanwhile, the distribution of CDM projects has been quite skewed (e.g., Muller, 2007; 
Boyd et al., 2009; Flamos, 2010). The majority of LDCs have not reaped benefits from the 
CDM, whereas the major GHG emitters, especially China and India, have been receiving a 
lot of fund flows from Annex I countries and various positive side effects such as technology 
transfers, electricity generated from clean renewable sources, and the promotion of 
sustainable development in their own countries. Consequently, considering the current 
distributional imbalance of CDM projects, this study was conducted aiming to identify the 
determinants of CDM project hosting in order to recommend promising approaches for 
LDCs based on empirical evidence.   
  This study employed four categories of independent variables towards the dependent 
variable, the log of the number of CDM projects. By running random effects panel Tobit 
models, this study specified five statistically significant decisive factors as shown in Table 19. 
At first, all independent variables were expected to show significance in regression results. 
However, four variables, namely GDP per capita, control of corruption, tertiary school 
enrolment rate, and ODA received, resulted in being insignificant. Furthermore, contrary to 
the expectation, it is confirmed that the former British colony dummy has negative 
significant effects on CDM project hosting, implying CDM investors have not utilised 
colonial ties for their business. Based on the empirical analysis, this paper revealed that the 
persisting four significant factors, GHG reduction potentials, governance levels, science and 
technology levels, and economic ties between host and Annex I countries in the private sector, 
have positive impacts on hosting CDM projects. This empirical evidence can be accepted 
from the theoretical perspective as well. 
 
5.2  Policy implications 
LDCs’ future concerning the CDM will depend on how successfully they can use the 
findings of this study in a factual manner. Admittedly, it is impossible to boost the past GHG 
  pg. 23 
 
emission levels in the base year. LDCs, hence, should focus exclusively on factors which 
they can control. It is likely to be possible that LDCs can improve the levels of their 
governance, science and technology, and economic ties with Annex I countries by 
ameliorating related factors. If these were to be accomplished in reality, LDCs would have 
better condition prospects for attracting CDM investors.  
Alternatively, taking a different perspective on a promising approach for LDCs, it seems 
feasible to develop the programmatic CDM. The reason for this is because, as mentioned 
above, LDCs have a serious disadvantage in their lower GHG reduction potentials. It is 
obviously not reasonable for them to simulate the major GHG emitters such as China. 
Currently, several international organisations have been actively trying to boost CDM 
activities including the programmatic CDM in LDCs and, thanks to this, the number of CDM 
activities in LDCs are actually increasing slowly but surely. The information of the 
programmatic CDM is described in Appendix II. 
In summary, the effective way to promote CDM activities in LDCs is to approach both 
sides: one is that LDCs improve the significant factors by themselves; and the other is to 
facilitate the programmatic CDM activities by enlisting cooperation from international 
organisations or firms capable of investing in CDM activities in LDCs and/or providing 
capacity building programs.  
 
5.3  Remaining challenges 
The findings of this study are based on the limited data for the period between 2005 and 
2010 due to data availability. It is hoped that further empirical studies will utilise data after 
2011. Furthermore, it is worth applying other analytical models and/or independent variables 
as there might be better models and/or variables for a panel data regarding the distribution of 
CDM projects. More specifically, it might be interesting to add regional dummies empirical 
models because the significance and effects of each variable may be different from a region 
where eligible host countries are situated. This seems to help LDCs identify more useful and 
practical approaches. 
 
5.4  Concluding statement 
The CDM is a mechanism not only for alleviating the impacts of global warming but also for 
enhancing sustainable development in host countries, and what is more, the CDM can 
generate a new type of fund flows, having similar feature to subsidies. Nonetheless, the 
CDM has not been actively addressing the poor (Michaelowa, A. and K. Michaelowa, 2007).   
However, even though the benefits from CDM activities has not directly reached poor 
people, those activities certainly exert beneficial impacts on their lives from the standpoint of 
poverty alleviation and the protection of a clean environment. Developing countries 
including LDCs, therefore, should aggressively press ahead with the development of CDM 
projects for the sake of improving their quality of life, although there is a criticism that CDM 
projects may not be really additional, meaning that some of them may have been 
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implemented without CDM status (e.g., Lecocq and Ambrosi, 2007). Therefore, the key 
point here is to receive additional fund flows from richer countries using the CDM. To do 
this, LDCs are recommended to ameliorate the controllable significant factors that this study 
revealed and give positive consideration to implementing the programmatic CDM.    
Looking back at history, humankind has improved the quality of life by making 
innovations happen such as the industrial revolution and green revolution. Hence, it is hoped 
that both Annex I and Non-Annex I countries tackle the climate change issue with 
stimulating the effective use of this innovative mechanism, the CDM, not only in advanced 
developing countries but also in LDCs. 
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Table 1  List of least developed countries (LDCs) 
There are 49 LDCs under UNFCCC. The majority of LDCs do not possess any CDM 
projects and the most successful LDC which is Uganda host only 10 CDM projects. 
Name of countries No. of CDM 
projects 
Name of countries No. of CDM 
projects 
Africa (33) 
Angola 0 Madagascar 2 
Benin 0 Malawi  0 
Burkina Faso  0 Mali  1 
Burundi  0 Mauritania 1 
Central African Republic  0 Mozambique 0 
Chad  0 Niger  0 
Comoros  0 Rwanda  3 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 2 São Tomé and Príncipe  0 
Djibouti 0 Senegal 4 
Equatorial Guinea 0 Sierra Leone 0 
Eritrea 0 Somalia▲ n.a. 
Ethiopia  1 Sudan 0 
Gambia 0 Togo 0 
Guinea 0 Uganda  10 
Guinea-Bissau  0 United Republic of Tanzania 1 
Lesotho  0 Zambia  1 
Liberia 1 
Asia (15) 
Afghanistan  0 Nepal  6 
Bangladesh 3 Samoa  0 
Bhutan  1 Solomon Islands  0 
Cambodia 6 Timor-Leste  0 
Kiribati  0 Tuvalu  0 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic  2 Vanuatu  0 
Maldives 0 Yemen 0 
Myanmar 0 
Latin America and the Caribbean (1) 
Haiti 0 
▲: Not parties to the UNFCCC 
Source: UNFCCC (2012a) 
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Table 2  Previous empirical studies on determinants of CDM projects 
Author(s) 
and year 
Model Dependent variable Significant factors 
Dinar et al. 
(2008) 
Poisson, Logit 
and Probit, and 
Tobit models 
The number of CDM 
projects, the amount of 
CO2 abatement, and the 
volume of investments. 
GDP, energy use, governance, 
Ease of Doing Business, 
renewable energy, level of 




Gravity model The expected amounts of 
CERs during the 1st 
period. 
GHG emissions of host and 
investor countries, project size, 








The number of registered 
CDM projects (as of the 
end of 2008). 
GDP per capita, GDP growth 
rate, trade per GDP, renewable 









The number of CDM 
projects, the amount of 
expected CERs. 
GHG emissions, electricity 
capacity growth, CDM capacity 
building, and education index. 
Kasai 
(2012) 
Tobit model The numbers of bilateral 
and unilateral CDM 
projects. 
GHG emissions, energy imports, 
science levels, tertiary school 
enrolment rates, ease of 
registering property, ease of 
getting credit, and ease of 
paying tax. 
 
Table 3  The number of CDM projects reducing HFCs, PFCs, and SF6 
The table clearly shows that CDM project reducing high GWP gases are located only in industrially 
well developed countries. 
Host country The number of CDM projects 
HFCs          PFCs           SF6            Total 
China 11 0 1 12 
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India 7 1 0 8 
South Korea 1 0 6 7 
Brazil 0 1 1 2 
Argentina 1 1 0 2 
Israel 0 0 2 2 
Indonesia 0 1 0 1 
Mexico 1 0 0 1 
Source: IGES (2012) 
 
Table 4  Expected regression results 
Factors Control possibility a Expected result Expected effect b 
CO2 emissions Low Significant Positive (+++) 
GDP per capita 
Government effectiveness 










Tertiary school enrolment rate 



















a Control possibility shows the ease of control of a factor by host countries. 
b The number of “+” reflects the degree of expected influences on CDM project hosting. 
 
Table 5  Descriptions of dependent and independent variables 
Variables Descriptions Sources 
lncdmi The natural logarithm of the number of registered CDM 




lnco2i The natural logarithm of CO2 emissions stemming from the 
burning of fossil fuels and the manufacture of cement of the 
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govefi Government effectiveness is an indicator reflecting the 
degree of the quality of public services, its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to those policies. Percentile rank amongst all 




corrupti Control of corruption which reflects perceptions of the extent 
to which public power is exercised for private gain, including 
both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" 
of the state by elites and private interests. Percentile rank 





lntertiaryi The natural logarithm of gross tertiary school enrolment rate 




lnarticlei The natural logarithm of the number of scientific and 













World Bank  
Colonyi Dummy variable (Former British colonies =1, 0 otherwise) Hensel (2006) 
 
Table 6  Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients (2005) 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Log of the number of CDM projects 128 0.123 0.414 0 2.833 
Log of CO2 emissions 126 2.024 2.166 -2.302 8.417 
Log of GDP per capita 126 0.286 1.344 -2.407 3.471 
Government effectiveness 128 41.04 23.85 0 96.59 
Control of corruption 128 40.64 24.87 0 98.05 
Log of tertiary school enrolment rate 105 2.293 1.275 -1.56 4.486 
Log of the number of scientific journal articles 122 3.722 2.343 -0.693 10.26 
Log of FDI inflows 118 5.373 2.046 -0.673 10.75 
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Log of ODA received 103 5.03 1.263 1.818 6.905 
Former British colony dummy 128 0.334 0.474 0 1 
Panel B: Correlation coefficients among independent variables 
  lnco2 lngdppc govef corrup lntertiary lnarticle lnfdi lnoda colony 
lnco2 1.000                  
lngdppc 0.446  1.000                
govef 0.294  0.687  1.000              
corrup 0.087  0.536  0.844  1.000            
lntertiary 0.599  0.618  0.370  0.195  1.000          
lnarticle 0.816  0.291  0.362  0.193  0.451  1.000        
lnfdi 0.752  0.528  0.361  0.162  0.517  0.641  1.000      
lnoda 0.193  -0.504  -0.347 -0.322 -0.140  0.206  0.107  1.000    
colony 0.013  -0.028  0.194  0.080  -0.206  0.111  -0.009  -0.171  1.000  
 
Table 7  Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients (2006) 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Log of the number of CDM projects 128 0.327 0.886 0 4.82 
Log of CO2 emissions 126 2.074 2.178 -2.302 8.573 
Log of GDP per capita 126 0.416 1.351 -2.407 3.682 
Government effectiveness 128 40.38 24.16 0.490  96.10  
Control of corruption 128 39.74 24.44 0.490  98.54 
Log of tertiary school enrolment rate 105 2.344 1.26 -1.609 4.505 
Log of the number of scientific journal articles 123 3.725 2.377 -1.204 10.45 
Log of FDI inflows 123 5.493 2.21 -3.218 10.91 
Log of ODA received 99 4.979 1.22 0.488 6.899 
Former British colony dummy 128 0.335 0.474 0 1 
Panel B: Correlation coefficients among independent variables 
  lnco2 lngdppc govef corrup lntertiary lnarticle lnfdi lnoda colony 
lnco2 1.000                  
lngdppc 0.421  1.000                
govef 0.343  0.733  1.000              
corrup 0.121  0.680  0.855  1.000            
lntertiary 0.602  0.590  0.405  0.278  1.000          
lnarticle 0.852  0.312  0.390  0.193  0.502  1.000        
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lnfdi 0.754  0.537  0.449  0.228  0.510  0.644  1.000      
lnoda 0.232  -0.452  -0.238 -0.333 -0.060  0.247  0.083  1.000    
colony -0.083 0.058  0.140  0.126  -0.233  -0.044  -0.031  -0.199  1.000  
 
Table 8  Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients (2007) 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Log of the number of CDM projects 128 0.311 0.882 0 5.081 
Log of CO2 emissions 127 2.105 2.172 -2.207 8.664  
Log of GDP per capita 126 0.534 1.365 -2.207 3.884  
Government effectiveness 128 39.38 23.68 0.490  98.54  
Control of corruption 128 39.83 24.24 0.490  98.05  
Log of tertiary school enrolment rate 102 2.452 1.152 -0.755 4.520  
Log of the number of scientific journal articles 126 3.661 2.48 -2.302 10.64  
Log of FDI inflows 120 5.923 2.083 -0.579 11.67  
Log of ODA received 98 5.054 1.159 2.052 6.901  
Former British colony dummy 128 0.335 0.474 0 1 
Panel B: Correlation coefficients among independent variables 
  lnco2 lngdppc govef corrup lntertiary lnarticle lnfdi lnoda colony 
lnco2 1.000                  
lngdppc 0.484  1.000                
govef 0.216  0.702  1.000              
corrup 0.076  0.625  0.865  1.000            
lntertiary 0.604  0.708  0.416  0.300  1.000          
lnarticle 0.857  0.309  0.232  0.106  0.436  1.000        
lnfdi 0.736  0.496  0.374  0.252  0.494  0.674  1.000      
lnoda 0.172  -0.512  -0.327 -0.321 -0.193  0.259  0.093  1.000    
colony -0.169 0.147  0.327  0.243  -0.104  -0.110  -0.085  -0.294  1.000  
 
Table 9  Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients (2008) 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Log of the number of CDM projects 128  0.296  0.851  0.000  5.403  
Log of CO2 emissions 127  2.136  2.175  -2.120  8.766  
Log of GDP per capita 126  0.662  1.369  -2.120  4.102  
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Government effectiveness 128  39.82  23.86  0.98  99.02  
Control of corruption 128  39.87  24.57  0.49  98.05  
Log of tertiary school enrolment rate 102  2.478  1.147  -0.713  4.540  
Log of the number of scientific journal articles 127  3.810  2.402  -1.204  10.81  
Log of FDI inflows 120  6.177  2.134  -0.799  11.73  
Log of ODA received 98  4.998  1.241  1.188  6.849  
Former British colony dummy 128  0.336  0.474  0  1  
Panel B: Correlation coefficients among independent variables 
  lnco2 lngdppc govef corrup lntertiary lnarticle lnfdi lnoda colony 
lnco2 1.000                  
lngdppc 0.506  1.000                
govef 0.219  0.721  1.000              
corrup 0.014  0.576  0.820  1.000            
lntertiary 0.609  0.688  0.451  0.244  1.000          
lnarticle 0.830  0.306  0.260  0.096  0.453  1.000        
lnfdi 0.682  0.528  0.374  0.116  0.552  0.581  1.000      
lnoda 0.105  -0.575  -0.373 -0.426 -0.174  0.245  -0.014  1.000    
colony -0.143  0.167  0.268  0.231  -0.166  -0.143  -0.028  -0.334  1.000  
 
Table 10  Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients (2009) 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Log of the number of CDM projects 128  0.403  1.013  0.000  5.866  
Log of CO2 emissions 127  2.178  2.175  -2.120  8.823  
Log of GDP per capita 126  0.811  1.367  -2.040  4.263  
Government effectiveness 128  40.24  24.03  0.49  99.51  
Control of corruption 128  40.10  24.72  0.49  98.06  
Log of tertiary school enrolment rate 102  2.546  1.134  -0.713  4.689  
Log of the number of scientific journal articles 126  3.923  2.385  -1.204  10.95  
Log of FDI inflows 123  6.554  1.897  1.747  11.98  
Log of ODA received 96  5.189  1.146  1.999  6.863  
Former British colony dummy 128  0.336  0.474  0  1  
Panel B: Correlation coefficients among independent variables 
  lnco2 lngdppc govef corrup lntertiary lnarticle lnfdi lnoda colony 
lnco2 1.000                  
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lngdppc 0.491  1.000                
govef 0.268  0.678  1.000              
corrup 0.066  0.601  0.814  1.000            
lntertiary 0.602  0.704  0.395  0.231  1.000          
lnarticle 0.837  0.358  0.337  0.142  0.483  1.000        
lnfdi 0.722  0.456  0.372  0.176  0.515  0.671  1.000      
lnoda 0.222  -0.491  -0.257 -0.357 -0.150  0.308  0.204  1.000    
colony -0.229 0.197  0.329  0.282  -0.165  -0.221  -0.192  -0.466  1.000  
 
Table 11  Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients (2010) 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Log of the number of CDM projects 128  0.346  0.960  0.000  6.223  
Log of CO2 emissions 127  2.201  2.192  -2.120  8.858  
Log of GDP per capita 126  0.962  1.371  -1.966  4.459  
Government effectiveness 128  40.49  24.15  0.490  100  
Control of corruption 128  40.39  24.94  0.490  98.54  
Log of tertiary school enrolment rate 102  2.600  1.130  -0.693  4.800  
Log of the number of scientific journal articles 127  3.830  2.542  -1.204  11.09  
Log of FDI inflows 122  6.622  2.024  0.000  12.07  
Log of ODA received 94  5.232  1.199  1.963  6.880  
Former British colony dummy 128  0.336  0.474  0  1  
Panel B: Correlation coefficients among independent variables 
  lnco2 lngdppc govef corrup lntertiary lnarticle lnfdi lnoda colony 
lnco2 1.000                  
lngdppc 0.540  1.000                
govef 0.270  0.670  1.000              
corrup 0.025  0.583  0.847  1.000            
lntertiary 0.581  0.693  0.473  0.300  1.000          
lnarticle 0.833  0.399  0.354  0.148  0.529  1.000        
lnfdi 0.659  0.439  0.356  0.171  0.442  0.612  1.000      
lnoda 0.079  -0.506  -0.321 -0.360 -0.215  0.173  0.111  1.000    
colony -0.197 0.138  0.263  0.276  -0.146  -0.158  -0.116  -0.352  1.000  
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Table 12  Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients of the panel data 
for the period 2005-2010 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Log of the number of CDM projects 1024  0.226  0.755  0.000  6.223  
Log of CO2 emissions 760  2.120  2.170  -2.303  8.858  
Log of GDP per capita 756  0.612  1.376  -2.408  4.459  
Government effectiveness 768  40.23  23.89  0  100  
Control of corruption 768  40.10  24.55  0.000  98.54  
Log of tertiary school enrolment rate 618  2.451  1.186  -1.609  4.800  
Log of the number of scientific journal articles 751  3.779  2.417  -2.303  11.09  
Log of FDI inflows 726  6.027  2.116  -3.219  12.07  
Log of ODA received 588  5.079  1.205  0.489  6.905  
Former British colony dummy 1024  0.336  0.473  0.000  1.000  
Panel B: Correlation coefficients among independent variables 
  lnco2 lngdppc govef corrup lntertiary lnarticle lnfdi lnoda colony 
lnco2 1.000                  
lngdppc 0.465  1.000                
govef 0.269  0.671  1.000              
corrup 0.064  0.588  0.839  1.000            
lntertiary 0.593  0.667  0.409  0.258  1.000          
lnarticle 0.837  0.313  0.324  0.146  0.468  1.000        
lnfdi 0.166  -0.487  -0.310 -0.352 -0.150  0.235  1.000      
lnoda 0.697  0.523  0.366  0.187  0.518  0.612  0.094  1.000    
colony -0.133 0.117  0.252  0.208  -0.168  -0.092  -0.303  -0.065  1.000  
 
Table 13  Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for uncensored 
data (excluding only countries hosting CDM projects) (2005-2010) 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Log of the number of CDM projects 339  0.682  1.188  0.000  6.223  
Log of CO2 emissions 139  4.151  2.030  -0.755  8.858  
Log of GDP per capita 139  1.060  1.038  -1.427  3.688  
Government effectiveness 139  54.08  19.10  16.10  100  
Control of corruption 139  46.77  20.88  2.440  98.54  
Log of tertiary school enrolment rate 128  3.246  0.749  1.099  4.689  
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Log of the number of scientific journal articles 139  6.241  2.473  0.833  11.09  
Log of FDI inflows 137  7.743  1.925  0.928  12.07  
Log of ODA received 100  5.448  1.014  2.547  6.879  
Former British colony dummy 339  0.257  0.437  0  1  
Panel B: Correlation coefficients among independent variables 
  lnco2 lngdppc govef corrup lntertiary lnarticle lnfdi lnoda colony 
lnco2 1.000                  
lngdppc 0.427  1.000                
govef 0.336  0.622  1.000              
corrup 0.189  0.631  0.814  1.000            
lntertiary 0.253  0.643  0.359  0.341  1.000          
lnarticle 0.845  0.505  0.519  0.404  0.342  1.000        
lnfdi 0.131  -0.482  -0.428 -0.437 -0.351  -0.067  1.000      
lnoda 0.846  0.657  0.420  0.318  0.377  0.785  0.031  1.000    
colony 0.245  -0.065  0.195  0.023  -0.150  0.163  0.094  0.089  1.000  
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Table 14  Estimation results of cross-country data analysis in 2005&2006 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variables Log of the number of CDM projects registered in 2005   Log of the number of CDM projects registered in 2006 
Independent variables                           
Log of CO2 emissions 0.577*** 0.501** 0.561***     0.174   0.963*** 0.824*** 0.862***     0.663* 
(3.74) (2.62) (2.90)     (0.65)   (5.48) (4.06) (4.22)     (1.84) 
Log of GDP per capita -0.058     0.047 0.251 -1.212**   0.017     0.279 0.899* -0.188 
(-0.25)     (0.13) (0.55) (-2.47)   (0.07)     (0.53) (1.69) (-0.25) 
Government 
effectiveness 
  0.035***       0.051     0.017       0.022 
  (2.78)       (1.24)     (0.93)       (0.50) 
Control of corruption     0.020     -0.005       0.008     -0.007 
    (1.50)     (-0.15)       (0.57)     (-0.22) 
Log of tertiary school 
enrolment rate 
  -0.184 -0.030     0.178     0.465 0.560     0.335 
  (-0.60) (-0.09)     (0.62)     (1.22) (1.44)     (0.52) 
Log of the number of 
scientific journal articles 
        0.559*** 0.078           0.797*** -0.151 
        (2.94) (0.31)           (3.39) (-0.43) 
Log of FDI inflows       0.691***   0.579**         1.265***   0.697* 
      (2.73)   (2.20)         (4.43)   (1.84) 
Log of ODA received       0.339 0.359 -0.088         0.816* 0.979** 0.488 
      (1.10) (0.87) (-0.24)         (1.97) (2.08) (1.07) 
Former British colony 
dummy 
-0.804 -1.839** -1.642** -0.309 -0.794 -1.637**   -0.883 -1.090 -0.922 -0.829 -1.458* -0.921 
(-1.09) (-2.59) (-2.24) (-0.41) (-1.07) (-2.05)   (-1.38) (-1.46) (-1.21) (-1.02) (-1.84) (-1.03) 
Observations 124 104 104 93 96 74   124 104 104 92 94 74 
Log pseudo likelihood -46.4 -38.2 -39.2 -37.3 -36.5 -28.5  -71.3 -64.2 -64.4 -50.6 -53.6 -44.8 
Pseudo R-squared 0.173 0.245 0.226 0.197 0.222 0.305   0.231 0.230 0.227 0.271 0.232 0.286 
Values in parentheses are t statistics.             
*p<0.10,  **p<0.05,  ***p<0.01 
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Table 15  Estimation results of cross-country data analysis in 2007&2008 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variables Log of the number of CDM projects registered in 2007 Log of the number of CDM projects registered in 2008 
Independent variables                           
Log of CO2 emissions 1.125*** 0.894*** 1.015***     1.148***   1.108*** 0.944*** 1.021***     0.533 
(6.37) (4.75) (5.10)     (2.89)   (7.05) (5.92) (6.47)     (1.37) 
Log of GDP per capita 0.127     0.635 1.170*** -0.739   0.010     0.625 0.870* -0.040 
(0.50)     (1.29) (2.64) (-1.18)   (0.04)     (1.35) (1.78) (-0.07) 
Government 
effectiveness 
  0.053***       0.112***     0.032*       0.031 
  (3.31)       (3.45)     (1.85)       (0.97) 
Control of corruption     0.025*     -0.015       0.020     -0.001 
    (1.68)     (-0.52)       (1.41)     (-0.05) 
Log of tertiary school 
enrolment rate 
  0.083 0.488     0.719     -0.070 0.073     -0.137 
  (0.24) (1.16)     (1.54)     (-0.16) (0.18)     (-0.28) 
Log of the number of 
scientific journal articles 
        0.508*** -0.893**           0.602*** -0.066 
        (2.72) (-2.63)           (3.56) (-0.20) 
Log of FDI inflows       0.803***   0.580         0.911***   0.481* 
      (2.65)   (1.48)         (3.28)   (1.82) 
Log of ODA received       0.469 0.568 0.168         0.729* 0.724 0.431 
      (1.13) (1.29) (0.47)         (1.75) (1.64) (1.05) 
Former British colony 
dummy 
-0.886 -1.562** -1.001 -0.575 -0.794 -2.513***   -1.040 -1.494** -1.268* -1.753 -1.470* -1.899** 
(-1.29) (-2.27) (-1.28) (-0.61) (-0.90) (-3.47)   (-1.62) (-2.17) (-1.78) (-1.54) (-1.71) (-2.13) 
Observations 125 101 101 89 95 72   125 101 101 89 95 72 
Log pseudo likelihood -60.5 -50.4 -53.0 -41.8 -43.0 -29.2  -58.8 -52.3 -53.1 -34.9 -37.3 -32.6 
Pseudo R-squared 0.288 0.349 0.315 0.257 0.248 0.417   0.301 0.321 0.310 0.291 0.293 0.299 
Values in parentheses are t statistics.                       
*p<0.10,  **p<0.05,  ***p<0.01                         
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Table 16  Estimation results of cross-country data analysis in 2009&2010 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variables Log of the number of CDM projects registered in 2009   Log of the number of CDM projects registered in 2010 
Independent variables                           
Log of CO2 emissions 1.249*** 1.116*** 1.263***     1.222***   1.244*** 1.143*** 1.190***     1.964*** 
(10.36) (10.34) (9.77)     (4.82)   (11.12) (10.68) (9.96)     (4.47) 
Log of GDP per capita -0.119     -0.089 0.159 -0.884*   -0.548***     -0.303 -0.371 -3.757*** 
(-0.60)     (-0.14) (0.30) (-1.80)   (-2.88)     (-0.52) (-0.68) (-6.98) 
Government 
effectiveness 
  0.046***       0.059***     0.033***       0.048*** 
  (3.01)       (4.03)     (2.71)       (6.40) 
Control of corruption     0.022     0.003       0.005     0.025 
    (1.55)     (0.20)       (0.36)     (1.60) 
Log of tertiary school 
enrolment rate 
  -0.344 0.067     -0.271     -0.683** -0.300     2.242*** 
  (-1.28) (0.19)     (-0.73)     (-2.57) (-0.99)     (3.78) 
Log of the number of 
scientific journal articles 
        0.961*** -0.640***           1.069*** -0.631*** 
        (3.78) (-2.91)           (5.05) (-3.23) 
Log of FDI inflows       1.380***   0.750***         1.487***   1.214*** 
      (4.34)   (3.96)         (5.33)   (7.92) 
Log of ODA received       0.399 0.545 0.116         -0.239 -0.232 0.443*** 
      (1.00) (1.05) (0.50)         (-0.66) (-0.49) (3.52) 
Former British colony 
dummy 
0.348 -0.287 0.253 0.564 -0.069 -0.858   0.037 -0.315 0.079 -0.085 -0.019 -0.355* 
(0.66) (-0.52) (0.39) (0.71) (-0.08) (-1.66)   (0.08) (-0.65) (0.15) (-0.09) (-0.02) (-1.96) 
Observations 125 101 101 89 92 69   125 101 101 87 91 72 
Log pseudo likelihood -64.9 -49.7 -52.8 -40.5 -44.8 -19.5  -54.2 -47.9 -50.5 -25.1 -25.8 -14.7 
Pseudo R-squared 0.362 0.417 0.381 0.333 0.268 0.601   0.426 0.424 0.394 0.402 0.391 0.741 
Values in parentheses are t statistics.             
*p<0.10,  **p<0.05,  ***p<0.01               
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Table 17  Estimation results of pooled Tobit and panel Tobit (RE) with all eligible host countries (2005-2010) 
Models Pooled Tobit   Panel Tobit (random effect) 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variables Log of the number of CDM projects regisered in 2005-2010   Log of the number of CDM projects regisered in 2005-2010 
Independent variables                           
Log of CO2 emissions 1.083*** 0.941*** 1.014***     0.925***   1.013*** 0.877*** 0.924***     0.722*** 
(15.75) (12.98) (13.30)     (5.90)   (12.00) (11.56) (11.00)     (3.01) 
Log of GDP per capita -0.081     0.060 0.440** -0.919***   0.052     -0.271 0.080 -0.798** 
(-0.83)     (0.28) (2.34) (-3.64)   (0.38)     (-1.34) (0.47) (-2.32) 
Government 
effectiveness 
  0.033***       0.063***     0.027***       0.054*** 
  (4.62)       (4.32)     (2.63)       (2.76) 
Control of corruption     0.014**     -0.007       0.006     -0.014 
    (2.26)     (-0.54)       (0.73)     (-0.56) 
Log of tertiary school 
enrolment rate 
  -0.083 0.159     0.158     0.042 0.283     0.048 
  (-0.51) (0.93)     (0.66)     (0.19) (1.29)     (0.17) 
Log of the number of 
scientific journal articles 
        0.766*** -0.336**           0.835*** -0.062 
        (8.16) (-2.29)           (11.72) (-0.27) 
Log of FDI inflows       1.077***   0.553***         0.793***   0.411** 
      (7.36)   (3.92)         (4.54)   (2.16) 
Log of ODA received       0.363** 0.422** 0.109         -0.026 0.026 -0.032 
      (2.18) (2.28) (0.65)         (-0.17) (0.22) (-0.17) 
Former British colony 
dummy 
-0.435* -0.929*** -0.593* -0.385 -0.807** -1.694***   -0.542** -0.934** -0.584* -0.707** -1.165*** -1.818*** 
(-1.66) (-3.20) (-1.94) (-0.97) (-2.20) (-4.44)   (-2.21) (-2.50) (-1.90) (-2.35) (-3.68) (-5.63) 
Observations 748 612 612 539 563 433   748 612 612 539 563 433 
Log pseudo likelihood -374.0 -324.0 -331.3 -247.5 -251.9 -193.0   -332.5 -292.5 -295.1 -217.3 -214.6 -181.1 
Pseudo R-squared 0.279 0.297 0.281 0.242 0.244 0.339               
Wald test: Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
sigma_u               1.536 1.415 1.509 1.898 1.819 1.293 
sigma_e               1.278 1.253 1.254 1.167 1.16 1.188 
Rho               0.591 0.561 0.591 0.726 0.711 0.542 
Values in parentheses are t statistics;  *p<0.10,  **p<0.05,  ***p<0.01                   
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Table 18  Estimation results of pooled and panel OLS with uncensored data (only countries hosting CDM projects) (2005-2010) 
Models Pooled OLS Panel OLS Fixed Effect Panel OLS Random Effect 
Specificatoins (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variables Log of the number of CDM projects registered during the period 2005-2010 
Independent variables                                   
Log of CO2 emissions 0.566*** 0.571*** 0.587***     0.547*** 1.343 1.408 1.304     1.587 0.525*** 0.544*** 0.565***     0.513*** 
(10.60) (11.15) (11.30)     (5.59) (1.22) (1.42) (1.32)     (1.11) (7.18) (7.75) (7.79)     (4.27) 
Log of GDP per capita -0.106     -0.373 0.089 -0.165 0.336     -0.910*** -0.194 -1.756*** -0.0111     -0.365 -3E-06 -0.169 
(-1.22)     (-1.54) (0.52) (-0.70) (0.85)     (-3.29) (-0.70) (-5.01) (-0.11)     (-1.50) (-0.00) (-0.66) 
Government 
effectiveness 
  0.009       0.009   0.019       -0.054*   0.010       0.007 
  (1.56)       (0.90)   (0.74)       (-2.00)   (1.50)       (0.64) 
Control of corruption     0.009**     0.005     0.008     -0.015     0.009*     0.005 
    (2.07)     (0.73)     (0.53)     (-0.63)     (1.66)     (0.63) 
Log of tertiary school 
enrolment rate 
  -0.295* -0.314**     -0.309   1.120 1.222     -1.296**   -0.207 -0.218     -0.317 
  (-1.89) (-2.16)     (-1.62)   (1.15) (1.27)     (-2.05)   (-1.20) (-1.29)     (-1.47) 
Log of the number of 
scientific journal articles 
        0.309*** -0.091         0.836 0.863         0.327*** -0.063 
        (4.73) (-1.16)         (1.20) (1.11)         (3.76) (-0.62) 
Log of FDI inflows       0.534***   0.118       0.614***   0.717***       0.442***   0.118 
      (4.94)   (1.08)       (4.61)   (3.54)       (3.77)   (1.05) 
Log of ODA received       -0.083 0.131 -0.041       -0.050 0.051 0.041       -0.086 0.075 -0.065 
      (-0.78) (1.43) (-0.36)       (-0.44) (0.35) (0.39)       (-0.69) (0.66) (-0.53) 
Former British colony 
dummy 
-0.288 -0.215 -0.173 0.245 -0.206 -0.253             -0.275 -0.329 -0.259 0.052 -0.250 -0.360 
(-1.25) (-0.78) (-0.68) (0.76) (-0.66) (-0.60)             (-1.09) (-1.06) (-0.90) (0.12) (-0.69) (-0.75) 
Observations 139 128 128 98 100 91 139 128 128 98 100 91 139 128 128 98 100 91 
R-squared                                     
within             0.081 0.102 0.097 0.105 0.018 0.183 0.073 0.052 0.033 0.088 0.013  0.017 
between             0.570  0.554 0.531 0.290  0.394 0.414  0.596 0.664 0.664 0.360  0.410  0.640  
overall 0.580 0.635 0.638 0.460 0.368 0.597 0.548 0.532 0.519 0.359 0.355 0.437 0.575 0.631 0.634 0.456 0.365  0.595 
F test: Prob>F             0.000  0.002  0.002  0.001  0.000  0.024              
sigma_u             2.009 2.568 2.356  0.993  1.381 4.954 0.469 0.423 0.421 0.683 0.629 0.440  
sigma_e             0.773 0.776 0.779 0.697 0.719 0.694 0.773 0.776 0.779 0.697 0.719 0.694 
Rho             0.871 0.916 0.902 0.670  0.787 0.981 0.269 0.229 0.226 0.490  0.433 0.287 
Hausman test: Prob>chi2                       0.191 0.180  0.176 0.710  0.935 0.159 
Values in parentheses are t statistics; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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   Table 19  Summary table of estimation results 
Factors Control possibility a Regression result Effects 
CO2 emissions Low Significant Positive 
GDP per capita 
Government effectiveness 
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Fig. 1  Accumulated numbers of projects submitted for validation, registered 
projects, and projects with issuance 
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Fig. 2  Registered CDM projects by host party 
Source: UNFCCC (2012c) 
 
 
Fig. 3  CERs issued by host party 
Source: UNFCCC (2012d) 
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Fig. 5  The number of CDM projects by investor countries 
CDM investors in the U.K. have participated in 2,211 projects out of the total project in pipeline, 5,916 
(as of 1 July 2012). It is obvious that CDM investors in the U.K. have outstanding presence in CDM 
markets. Note that a certain number of CDM projects were invested in by more than one investor. 
Source: UNEP Risø Centre (2012) 
 
Fig. 6  Periods needed to obtain CDM status 
This graph shows the actual number of days needed for proposed projects to be registered as CDM 
projects (i.e., the periods from the request for registration to registrations by the CDM executive board). 
The registration process seems to be more effective from 2010. Given the preparation periods before 
the registration request, this study sets two-year lags for all independent variables based on this graph. 















































































































Fig. 7  An analytical procedure 
  
Multi-year cross-section analysis using Tobit models (2005-2010) 
Robustness checks using panel OLS models (fixed & random effects) 
Panel data analysis using panel Tobit models (random effects) 
Note: To check and compare the trend of each year’s estimation results. 
Note: This is the main model for the determinants of CDM project hosting in this study. 
Note: To confirm the robustness of the results obtained from panel Tobit. F test and Hausman 
test are to be conducted in order to specify the most appropriate model.  
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Appendix I: Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) 
 
GWPs referenced to the updated decay response for the Bern carbon cycle model and future CO2 






GWPs (Time horizon) 
20 years 100 years 500 years 
CO2 CO2 5 – 200b 1 1 1 
Methane a CH4 12±3 56 21 6.5 
Nitrous oxide N2O 120 280 310 170 
HFC-23 CHF3 264 9100 11700 9800 
HFC-32 CH2F2 5.6 2100 650 200 
HFC-41 CH3F 3.7 490 150 45 
HFC-43-10mee C5H2F10 17.1 3000 1300 400 
HFC-125 C2HF5 32.6 4600 2800 920 
HFC-134 C2H2F4 10.6 2900 1000 310 
HFC-134a CH2FCF3 14.6 3400 1300 420 
HFC-152a C2H4F2 1.5 460 140 42 
HFC-143 C2H3F3 3.8 1000 300 94 
HFC-143a C2H3F3 48.3 5000 3800 1400 
HFC-227ea C3HF7 36.5 4300 2900 950 
HFC-236fa C3H2F6 209 5100 6300 4700 
HFC-245ca C3H3F5 6.6 1800 560 170 
Sulphur hexafluoride SF6 3200 16300 23900 34900 
Perfluoromethane CF4 50000 4400 6500 10000 
Perfluoroethane C2F6 10000 6200 9200 14000 
Perfluoropropane C3F8 2600 4800 7000 10100 
Perfluorobutane C4F10 2600 4800 7000 10100 
Perfluorocyclobutane c-C4F8 3200 6000 8700 12700 
Perfluoropentane C5F12 4100 5100 7500 11000 
Perfluorohexane C6F14 3200 5000 7400 10700 
a The GWP for methane includes indirect effects of tropospheric ozone production and stratospheric 
water vapour production.   
b No single lifetime can be defined for CO2 due to the different rates of uptake by different removal 
processes. 
Source: UNFCCC (2012e) 
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Appendix II: The programmatic CDM 
 
Background   
The CMP at its first session decided that a local/regional/national policy or standard cannot be 
considered as a clean development mechanism project activity, but that project activities under 
a programme of activities can be registered as a single clean development mechanism project 
activity provided that approved baseline and monitoring methodologies are used that, inter alia, 
define the appropriate boundary, avoid double counting and account for leakage, ensuring that 
the net anthropogenic removals by sinks and emission reductions are real, measurable and 
verifiable, and additional to any that would occur in the absence of the project activity.  
 
32nd Meeting of the CDM Executive Board (EB32) 
The Executive Board adopted procedures at its 32nd meeting regarding the registration of a 
programme of activities as a single CDM project activity and issuance of certified emission 
reductions for a programme of activities. 
Designated Operational Entities may now publish documentation related to programmes for 
global stakeholder consultation during validation. Such documentation will be made available 
via this webpage. As the process of registering programme of activities evolves further 
information will be made available on this section of the CDM website. 
 
33rd Meeting of the CDM Executive Board (EB33) 
The Board, at its thirty-third meeting, approved the CDM Programme of Activities Design 
Document form (PoA-DD), CDM Programme Activity Design Document form (PoA-CPA- 
DD), Small-Scale CDM Programme of Activities Design Document form (SSC-PoA-DD) and 
Small-Scale CDM Programme Activity Design Document form (PoA-CPA-SSC-DD). 
The Board clarified that the registration fee for a PoA is based on the total expected annual 
emission reductions of the CPAs that will be submitted together with the request for registration 
of the PoA. The calculation of the amount to be paid and the procedures for payment will 
follow mutatis mutandis the existing rules for the payment of a registration fee (annex 35 to 
‘EB 23 Report’). For each CPA which is included subsequently, no fee is to be paid. Fees are to 
be paid by the coordinating/managing entity to the secretariat. 
Source: UNFCCC website <http://cdm.unfccc.int/ProgrammeOfActivities/index.html> 
Advantages of the programmatic CDM 
The procedures for the CDM Programme of Activities (PoA) were adopted in the EB 
meeting in June 2009. The new programme has some specific advantages over the 
normal CDM. One of them is the existence of the Coordinating or Managing Entity 
(CME) of a PoA. A CME coordinates the projects under a PoA, or CDM Programme 
Activities (CPAs), and manages their operations and CER issuances.  
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In addition to the existence of a CME, the PoA has other interesting original features. 
There is no limit on the number of CPAs under a PoA and no requirement for additional 
registration fees after the registration of its first CPA. Also, each CPA can set its own 
crediting period. This individual crediting period may reduce losses of CERs issued out 
of the uniformly-set crediting period for a bundled normal CDM project and be more 
beneficial to a CME. 





Fig. 9 The comparison of the normal CDM and the programmatic CDM 
Source: Kasai (2011) Skewed distribution of benefits from Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM): determinants of CDM projects hosting, ADR research paper, 
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS).  
 
